Y Pwyllgor Cyfrifon Cyhoeddus a Gweinyddiaeth Gyhoeddus

Public Accounts and Public Administration Committee

02/10/2024

Aelodau'r Pwyllgor a oedd yn bresennol

Committee Members in Attendance

Luke Fletcher Yn dirprwyo ar ran Adam Price
Substitute for Adam Price
Mark Isherwood Cadeirydd y Pwyllgor
Committee Chair
Mike Hedges
Natasha Asghar
Rhianon Passmore

Y rhai eraill a oedd yn bresennol

Others in Attendance

Anthony Veale Archwilio Cymru
Audit Wales
Dr Andrew Goodall Ysgrifennydd Parhaol, Llywodraeth Cymru
Permanent Secretary, Welsh Government
Ed Williams Cyfarwyddwr Adnoddau, Comisiwn y Senedd
Director of Resources, Senedd Commission
Hefin David Comisiynydd y Gyllideb a Llywodraethiant, Comisiwn y Senedd
Commissioner for Budget and Governance, Senedd Commission
Leanne Baker Prif Swyddog Pobl, Comisiwn y Senedd
Chief People Officer, Senedd Commission
Manon Antoniazzi Prif Weithredwr a Chlerc y Senedd
Chief Executive and Clerk of the Senedd
Simon Hart Prif Swyddog Cyllid Dros Dro, Comisiwn y Senedd
Interim Chief Financial Officer, Senedd Commission

Swyddogion y Senedd a oedd yn bresennol

Senedd Officials in Attendance

Fay Bowen Clerc
Clerk
Lowri Jones Dirprwy Glerc
Deputy Clerk
Manon Jones Ymchwilydd
Researcher
Martin Jennings Ymchwilydd
Researcher
Owain Davies Ail Glerc
Second Clerk

Cofnodir y trafodion yn yr iaith y llefarwyd hwy ynddi yn y pwyllgor. Yn ogystal, cynhwysir trawsgrifiad o’r cyfieithu ar y pryd. Lle mae cyfranwyr wedi darparu cywiriadau i’w tystiolaeth, nodir y rheini yn y trawsgrifiad.

The proceedings are reported in the language in which they were spoken in the committee. In addition, a transcription of the simultaneous interpretation is included. Where contributors have supplied corrections to their evidence, these are noted in the transcript.

Cyfarfu’r pwyllgor yn y Senedd a thrwy gynhadledd fideo.

Dechreuodd y cyfarfod am 09:18.

The committee met in the Senedd and by video-conference.

The meeting began at 09:18.

1. Cyflwyniad, ymddiheuriadau, dirprwyon a datgan buddiannau
1. Introductions, apologies, substitutions and declarations of interest

Bore da and croeso. Good morning and welcome to the Public Accounts and Public Administration Committee meeting in the Senedd this morning. The meeting is bilingual. Headsets provide simultaneous translation on channel 1 and sound amplification on channel 2. Participants online can access translation by clicking on the globe icon on Zoom. Apologies have been received from one Member, Adam Price, but I'm pleased to welcome Luke Fletcher, who is deputising for him. Before we begin, do Members have any declarations of registrable interest they wish to share that are not already on their public registers of interest? No. Thank you very much indeed.

2. Sesiwn dystiolaeth: Llawlyfrau Cabinet a Chod y Gweinidogion
2. Evidence Session: Cabinet Manuals and the Ministerial Code

That takes us to our first session, which is on the Cabinet handbook and ministerial code. I'd be grateful if the participant of this meeting—our witness, who is known well to this committee—could formally identify himself and state his role for the record.

Diolch, Cadeirydd. Diolch am y gwahoddiad i siarad gyda chi y bore yma. Andrew Goodall dwi, Ysgrifennydd Parhaol Llywodraeth Cymru.

Thank you, Chair. Thank you for the invitation to speak to committee this morning. I am Andrew Goodall, the Permanent Secretary of Welsh Government.

Diolch; thank you. I appreciate that you have a colleague who had been planning to attend, but, for genuine personal reasons, he's unable to be with us this morning. So, we thank you for, nonetheless, joining us today. As you might expect, we have a number of questions we'd like to ask you. I therefore ask both you and Members to be as succinct as possible so that we can cover as wide a range as possible of those questions as we can. 

There will be short break after an hour, approximately, into the evidence session for a comfort break.

So, as convention has it, if I can begin with the first set of questions. So, on 2 July this year, Nation.Cymru reported that the Welsh Government had rejected its request made under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 for disclosure of its Cabinet handbook. The rejection was on the grounds of an exemption under section 22 of the Act, which relates to information intended for future publication. What further information, if any, can you provide to expand on this and the reasons for your assessment, particularly given that most of the contents of the Welsh Government Cabinet handbook are already in the public domain?

09:20

Diolch, Cadeirydd. So, there is a UK Cabinet manual, which is in the public domain, and we have a Cabinet handbook, which we provide as internal guidance to Ministers. Despite the similarity in the labels, they do serve different purposes. And perhaps if I could just outline that to Members, Chair, with your agreement. So, the Cabinet handbook, from an internal Welsh Government perspective, is where we collate relevant information from a range of different sources. It kind of acts as a compendium, I suppose, to support Ministers as they arrive and discharge their functions. And, over the years, its purpose has been, simply, to provide that internal-facing support. You’re quite right to say that there will be elements of the information contained in there that are already in the public domain, but also, at the same time, in the content of the handbook, there are elements that are more personal in respect of Ministers’ roles. Just as two examples, without going to detail, it does cover security arrangements. It also covers aspects of personal support and well-being, both of which we don’t feel are appropriate areas to put into the public domain.

The UK Cabinet manual, just to compare and contrast, was deliberately a document put together to be more outward-facing. So, it was there to describe, for an external audience, the machinery of Government through a variety of lenses, and, actually, has a broader content than we have in our own handbook. So, it will, for example, draw in—and you will have seen this yourselves, of course—wider contextual information—so, the role of the sovereign, the nature of parliamentary democracy, elections, the machinery of Parliament itself. So, I think there is a different purpose in this.

So, obviously, with the interest of the committee—and I know, of course, that we have provided you, in confidence, with a copy of the Cabinet handbook to help your own deliberations—we are looking to produce a version that is appropriate and suitable to be put into the public domain. I do think that it will help some of the transparency, and, perhaps, for an awareness of some of the mechanisms that we have in place, albeit it, of course, to some of the same conditions, that there is some information that we would still feel shouldn’t be contained or shared. And we are working on that version; I hope to produce something that is relevant and appropriate by the end of this calendar year. Of course, I know that you have been going through your own deliberations, have extended some consultation around these types of issues as well, and we'd genuinely be interested to take on board any comments or reflections the committee has had in terms of the content, given that we’ve shared it.

But I think we are actually shifting the objective and the focus of what our original Cabinet handbook was intended to do. So, it does act as that kind of navigation system for Ministers internally within Welsh Government. And, of course, we’ll now try to respond to that wider interest as well. So, I hope that helps as a broad outline, Chair, but happy to take any questions, of course.

Will the Welsh Government be publishing its Cabinet handbook, either in full or redacted form, given your statements, and, if so, when can we expect that to happen?

Well, again, if there are any reflections you have from the committee, I'm very happy to take those in good order, but we’ve been aiming to do that, with the support of our Cabinet secretariat, by the end of this calendar year. I would like to be open, certainly with the committee, about areas or topics that we have chosen to exclude. Also, of course, I’m happy to test a version of that with you, if that’s something that helps, I guess, behind the scenes before we publish it in that way.

And what I hope we can do is maybe just bring some light on areas, but actually show that, as you’ve indicated already, this is more of a signposting document, with a range of supporting information that is already in the public domain. As an example, whilst it trails and outlines, in very general terms, the ministerial code, of course the ministerial code has its own status and is available in the public domain already as well. But I think our intention, in response to the committee's interest, would be by the end of this calendar year, Chair.

09:25

Thank you. I'm sure you'll appreciate that non-disclosure generates concerns that may not be merited, and therefore I'd suggest it is in everyone's interest for this to be fully in the public domain, provided it doesn't create risks for individuals in terms of security, for example.

Yes, indeed, Chair. And perhaps just to comment, one of the things that we're very aware of is that, in pulling together this information, it still remains an iterative document—it does need to adapt and understand changes that are happening around us in Government as well that would be relevant to include in there. I guess, if I look at our Welsh examples, the introduction of the co-operation agreement, for example, which may not have been part of the original content, while it was alive and active would have been very relevant content for us to update on. But it's interesting to note as well that the current UK Cabinet manual, as the closest equivalent, hasn't been updated since 2011. It means it's probably stayed the same document through three if not four parliamentary terms. And I think that process of ensuring that it's updated and relevant is going to be really important as well. Again, I'll commit to make sure we can make that happen, with the First Minister's support, of course.

Of course, it should be a living document, but it should, in my view—and, obviously, the committee may share my view or not; we'll discuss that later in private—be publicly accountable and transparent. And in that context, in his consultation response, Professor Pedr ap Llwyd noted the importance of transparency in Government, adding that, by relying on unpublished guidance for unauthorised disclosures, it is difficult to understand how the Welsh Government handles such cases. How can the Welsh Government demonstrate transparency in its decision making about unauthorised disclosures or leaks and reassure the public that it has robust mechanisms in place when these procedures are not published?

The unauthorised disclosures guidance is not a formal part of the UK Cabinet manual and is advice that we follow in Welsh Government, but is actually protected and overseen by Cabinet Office. So, we're unable to release that information ourselves into the public, but, actually, it's not available in the public domain at the UK level either. That is simply because of the nature of the unauthorised disclosures area. Whilst they will be rare and exceptional events, they will operate around information that is protected from a Government perspective, under either the 'official' or 'official-sensitive' label. So, we simply follow that guidance and advice from a UK Government perspective, and don't have the oversight or control over that way.

Given your question, however, is how is it possible for us to help with the understanding and awareness of that, I think it's very possible, in general terms, without breaching perhaps the confidentiality of that process, to draw that into our version of the Cabinet handbook, so at least there is a section that will give an overview of those arrangements and how they would work in practice. But these unauthorised disclosure reports, for example, are never themselves, as part of investigations at the UK Government level, put into the public domain because they will tend to operate in a far more sensitive environment as well about processes and procedures. Chair, I don't know if that helps as an offer, but I think I can certainly make some general alignments to those areas without, I think, compromising the confidentiality of the process itself.

Yes, please, and your earlier offer to share confidentially the developing document for our comment. I'll now invite other Members to develop our lines of questioning with you, starting with Mike Hedges. So, over to you, Mike.

Diolch, Cadeirydd. Paragraph 1.7 of the ministerial code indicates the First Minister has options on how they can deal with complaints about ministerial conduct. Can you talk the committee through these options and the role that Welsh Government civil servants, and their resources, have in that proces?

Yes, of course. A fundamental principle of the way in which the ministerial code applies is that it's up to the First Minister to decide how complaints under the code are to be handled. The First Minister may simply ask for advice on the appropriate response, is entitled to initiate a response themselves. But, alternatively, rather than taking up that, whilst permitted under the code, the First Minister, on the one hand, may ask for an independent adviser, depending on the circumstances, to investigate the complaint. Or included in the code is the process by which they can ask the Permanent Secretary to investigate—of course, that’s myself—but can actually draw in colleagues in the propriety and ethics team who actually work to provide the more independent support in this area.

The First Minister can ask for a scoping investigation to be undertaken, which, again, I would discharge in my role, to consider if an external investigation would be necessary. But it’s perhaps also, to help the understanding of the committee, worth saying that complaints under the ministerial code do come from a number of different sources. So, as an example, members of the public can write into our complaints unit, or indeed direct to the First Minister’s office. Of course, Senedd Members themselves may write to the First Minister or myself making a complaint under the code. There can be occasions when a Cabinet Secretary or a Minister may refer themselves to the First Minister and ask for an investigation, just because of the circumstances that have arisen.

But the usual practice would be that the complaints that come in are just referred across to the director of propriety and ethics or his deputy for advice—that’s acting on my behalf. Most complaints that we get in, which may surprise Members, can often represent a misunderstanding of the ministerial code. They, whilst being received, may just get a courteous response explaining why we do not consider that the case is appropriate under the ministerial code. An example of that could be dissatisfaction, for example, with a policy decision that’s been made by Ministers, and perhaps a member of the public seeking to use the ministerial code as a way of appealing against that kind of decision.

Complaints that might have a case for investigation, that may come from Senedd Members or other sources, may also just simply be referred for advice on handling. But there are times, depending on how straightforward the issue is, when the First Minister’s office could deal with it without reference to the civil service. It is a choice of, or at the discretion of the First Minister to undertake that. But in most circumstances, there will be advice that is given, either on process or directly in response to a request from the First Minister as well.

09:30

If we turn to the independent adviser, is there a person who’s set up as an independent adviser who the First Minister would go to, or do you recommend an independent adviser, or is the First Minister able to choose somebody they wish for an independent adviser?

The choice of the process and the terms of paragraph 1.7 is for the First Minister to determine. Perhaps it’s worth saying, just for clarity, that the terms set out in 1.7, where 'independent adviser' and 'independent investigator' are used, are sort of used interchangeably. That’s probably just worth understanding. Where they are referred to, that will typically refer to the use of someone who is external to the Welsh Government. But when any First Minister seeks advice from the civil service in relation to the code—this can include, for example, where an investigation is taking place—that advice will, in any case, be undertaken independently, in the sense that it is always in line with the civil service code, judged objectively, impartially, and also without political interference or any attempt to steer the outcome or advice. So, our role in this respect is to discharge that, which is why, in part, we have the propriety and ethics function in Welsh Government, to just set that aside a little bit from the normal civil service advice process as well. The general experience, however, is that the propriety and ethics team, and asking the director of propriety and ethics in particular, will be the normal process that First Ministers have tended to use over years. But they do have the ability to call in an independent adviser if that’s appropriate and they wish to do so. But it is again at the discretion and choice of the First Minister.

And it could be anybody. It doesn't have to be a civil servant, it could be a lawyer, it could be a judge. It could be, in cases of financial complaint, an accountant.

Yes, I mean, it will be somebody who’s external. You would probably want and expect somebody to have an understanding or be grounded in an element of understanding the civil service or public service context. But you’re absolutely right, a lawyer could discharge that kind of function. If you look at the way in which independent advice is sought and worked through by other administrations, the Scottish Government, for example, have a process where they will have individuals who are appointed and made available within a process. We would have our own mechanisms for going down that route. You still have to comply with Welsh public money, make sure it adheres to procurement areas. But, yes, you would absolutely have somebody, if it's an independent adviser, who would come in from outside. But as I said earlier, our experience is that the majority of complaints that come in through this process are actually discharged, impartially and independently, through the proprietary and ethics team, and that is normal practice.

09:35

Terms that have been used are 'significant complaint' and 'undeniable breach'. Are they solely decided on by the First Minister?

There is a range of guidance. Perhaps, at the outset, I could just say that the ministerial code isn't a legal statutory document in and of itself, so, therefore, it doesn't require the normal legal definitions to underpin it, and, to some extent, we're not looking for the language that is used to have technical definitions in place. But as you've just inferred, it is up to the First Minister to decide what they consider to be significant, for example. I guess, as a rule of thumb, we would be looking for a reasonable interpretation of those, but it is, in the end, up to the First Minister to decide.

We have various terms within the document that will have a particular meaning, I guess, in that external test. So, an 'undeniable breach' would probably be a situation where it's self-evident beyond dispute that a breach has occurred, and so a requirement for an investigation may not be required. That might include, for example, where a Minister themselves may have asked for an investigation in terms of a concern that they themselves have broken the code—whilst it's a rare event, it would be that kind of situation.

The phraseology around 'no plausible case to answer', which is covered in this particular section, would encompass situations where perhaps there is a misunderstanding of what the code is there to do. And as I said earlier, in the example where perhaps there is a disagreement with a policy decision that's been made by Welsh Government, that would be one of those areas that would be covered there. The 'vexatious' term that will be familiar, I know, to Members around the table more broadly is just where, I guess, there's a refusal to accept a decision not to investigate, and there are continual representations that are being made, but with no additional arguments or evidence. A public interpretation is probably what's there, but, as you've said yourself, the First Minister ultimately would decide their own judgment on that.

We are quite familiar with complaints coming in to us as a public accounts committee, and to the auditor general—things that would apparently be vexatious. The last question from me: is there a danger, when you have investigations taken by civil servants against Ministers, that it could damage relationships between the civil servants and the Ministers?

Well, speaking openly, I suppose there is a danger of that. I personally don't believe that that should at all change the way in which the civil service gives its advice, given that we do steer to give that in an impartial and objective manner. That is our role, to both protect and support Ministers in that sense, and we are there to provide that level of guidance. But I think, bluntly, and this is undertaken by other administrations as well, that's why you see this central separation of the proprietary and ethics teams, because they sit separate from the normal day-to-day policy contact with Ministers, and I think that just allows us to ensure that perhaps the potential tensions that could exist there are taken away. The director of proprietary and ethics himself and his team are very experienced in handling these matters. They're very clear on the kind of guidance that is given and for that to be given in a very clear manner, without any interference as well, and I think that they have built up that experience over many years. So, although there is the possibility of that occurring, I would expect civil servants to still act in a proper manner. But we've tried to remove that tension from the process by having a central team available.

Can I just say, without going into cases, it doesn't work, because I know at least one former Minister who feels really aggrieved by the action of certain civil servants. I won't go any further than that, but that's just for your information. Okay. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much indeed. Can I bring in Natasha Asghar, please?

Thank you so much, Chair. Good morning, Dr Goodall. I'm glad you touched upon the director of proprietary and ethics, because that's a question that I'm going to be asking you about. Was the director of proprietary and ethics acting as an independent adviser under the terms of the code when he investigated whether the former Deputy Minister for Arts, Sport and Tourism had indeed breached the ministerial code, and if so, how indeed was he appointed?

Well, my understanding of how the director of proprietary and ethics would have approached that at this time would have been that he wasn't acting technically as an independent adviser, so that is not the usual process that First Ministers have chosen to do, but he would have been acting independently, in the manner that I've just described about how the investigation took place, the report was completed, and to give that impartial advice to the First Minister. So, I would describe it in these terms, of having a free hand to approach the work, to approach the report, and he would have done that in line with civil service code practice. So, yes, it would have been dealt with in respect of the role as director of propriety and ethics, with all of that experience as well, and I know from my conversations with him that he felt he was able to discharge that very appropriately, and provide the advice to the First Minister, as would be the usual process as well.

09:40

So, just for my own personal benefit to just understand, he was appointed at the request of the First Minister.

Yes. He was not appointed technically as the independent investigator. He was asked by the First Minister to undertake that in respect of his propriety and ethics role, which would be the normal practice.

Okay, thank you for clarifying that for me. On 23 May the director of propriety and ethics told the committee that he provided advice over the phone about a potential breach of the ministerial code by the then economy Minister. He then said that that advice was written up on his behalf, and he was acting as an independent adviser under the code, so—. My apologies. Yes, so that's what I want to know: if this is the case, how was he indeed appointed?

Again, this would be usual practice in discharging the code. Again, the First Minister has the opportunity to decide how he wants to proceed on this basis, but he would have been acting independently to give advice in respect of his director of propriety and ethics role, working with the propriety and ethics team. He wouldn't have been, or wasn't on that occasion, appointed as an independent adviser, but would have, as usual, just been giving his advice on the back of his experience and his day-to-day role as well, as I said earlier, removed from the usual civil service policy arena. 

Okay. So, Permanent Secretary, I just want to ask you, in relation to both of the cases that I just stated, the director of propriety and ethics—were they acting as an independent adviser on both of the cases that I just referred to?

No. As I've explained, they weren't acting as the independent adviser, referring to the language that is set out in the ministerial code and the permission that the FM has. The FM has the discretion to appoint that advice internally from the propriety and ethics team, which is under my responsibility as Permanent Secretary, and that was the route that the First Minister chose in both of those examples, which would have reflected normal practice.

Thank you very much for that. On 11 June 2024, and in relation to the former Minister for Social Partnership, the former First Minister told Plenary he took advice from you about the process to make sure he was acting within the ministerial code. Can you please describe your role for the committee, and the procedures that you followed in order to formulate it?

Yes. We have processes in place for examples of ministerial code breaches, and mechanisms that are there. I simply responded to a formal request from the First Minister's office, who was asking for process advice, and wanted to have next steps on the use of the ministerial code where there has been a potential breach of the code. And as we would do in our normal circumstances, we provided that response and advice back to the First Minister. We would have outlined in very general terms relevant sections within the code, again, which is all set out in the public domain, and would have highlighted some issues in there, including the importance of well-being support, for example, being made available. A formal request came in, as is usually the case with these examples, and we responded to it accordingly.

Okay, thank you so much. The director of propriety and ethics confirmed that no leak inquiry was commissioned or undertaken by the Welsh Government in relation to the recent case of the Minister for Social Partnership, but the former First Minister had indeed requested and received advice about the process for handling a breach of the ministerial code. So, can you please explain to the committee the interaction between the ministerial code and leak inquiries, please? 

Yes. They are two separate matters, and whilst it may feel that they are related, they are two very different things, and the process that I was talking about earlier around unauthorised disclosures does cover very rare and exceptional events where it relates to protected Government information, either under the official or official sensitive process. That has its own mechanism to be worked through and to be considered, and it's something that happens very rarely from a Government perspective generally, and certainly from a Welsh Government perspective. The ministerial code is a separate process, and that was how we responded to the request for process advice, which had come from the First Minister, and we simply provided that in the usual manner, as we would with all other examples in the ministerial code area as well.

Okay, thank you very much. Before 2021 the ministerial code gave no role to the Permanent Secretary and other officials for the investigation of breaches of the ministerial code. Versions of the code between 2007 and 2016 specifically said, and I quote,

'it is not the role of the Permanent Secretary or other officials to enforce it'—

the code—

'or to investigate Ministers'. Can you please explain what prompted this change, and why this was, indeed, deemed appropriate for the Welsh Parliament?

09:45

It would be helpful to know about the source of the change, because the current ministerial code is really clear that myself or officials do not enforce the code; I think it's paragraph 6.1—but I'd have to check that—that sets that out. So, from our perspective, there has been no change to that aspect. The code is a matter for the First Minister and remains a matter for the First Minister. That would be the equivalent process that exists in other administrations, of course, including at the UK Government level with the Prime Minister oversight as well. 

Maybe some of the changes in language that we have introduced there may be possibly allowing a different kind of interpretation there, but the First Minister does have an option, which is probably the bit that we've clarified, for the Permanent Secretary, as I discharge my own role, to investigate an alleged breach, and it could be that clarification. And also, there were changes to make sure that should there be any issues where staff had highlighted any concerns around ministerial behaviour, that that was something that could be brought to my attention within the code as well. But that wouldn't allow me to enforce the code; that would still remain absolutely a matter for the First Minister. 

So, I'm happy to explore that perhaps, Chair, in correspondence or to see what the source was, but I don't recognise that we've suddenly ended up with a different role. Civil servants aren't involved in enforcing the ministerial code; that's the oversight responsibility of the First Minister. 

Okay. Thank you, Dr Goodall. What role, if any, do special advisers play in providing advice to the First Minister and/or, indeed, civil servants about investigations into complaints about breaches of the ministerial code?

There's no formal role set out for special advisers in relation to dealing with breaches of the ministerial code. We provide advice when we are requested to do so, which goes to the First Minister for their consideration. Special advisers have their own code of conduct, which is laid out, which makes clear these kinds of arrangements as well, and that is available in the public domain. So, there is no formal role set out for them in the code or the process. 

Okay, and Dr Goodall, my final question for you: do you think the ministerial code that we have in place at the moment is sufficient, or do you think it needs work? 

Any changes that are put in place are a matter for any First Minister during their tenure. Typically, as First Ministers arrive into their post, they have an opportunity to think about whether there are any further improvements that they can put into the code, whether it's on the basis of their own personal reflections or as we are looking at other good practice elsewhere, for example; we do liaise with our colleagues across the UK. But it is a matter for the First Minister. We, of course, had a change of First Minister arrangements very recently, and the code that applies to the current Cabinet is the extant code, but I know the First Minister does have an interest in seeing whether there are improvements that could be put in place, and I would expect she would be interested in any reflections, of course, that the committee might want to make if she was to consider that as well. The civil service itself can't change the ministerial code, but, of course, we do try, when requested, to offer up some thoughts on how that could be improved, and we do liaise with our colleagues who work in propriety and ethics across the UK as well.

Thank you. I'll bring in Rhianon Passmore, please. 

Thank you very much, Chair. How then are external independent advisers appointed to investigate potential breaches of the ministerial code, and who is responsible for choosing and appointing them? 

It may help to draw in some of the examples that occur across the UK at UK Government level and Scottish Government level, but if I start first with our process. If the First Minister wanted to appoint an independent external adviser to investigate a possible breach of the ministerial code, then it would be up to them to decide who the adviser would be. They may wish to take advice from myself and, through me, from the propriety and ethics team, given their experience, but the code is really clear that there is no obligation to do so. But the appointment would still need to be made in accordance with our Welsh Government procurement rules, although that doesn't necessarily mean it would need to go out to competition. So, it's still possible to identify an individual. If I draw in the experience at a UK Government level and at the Scottish Government, independent advisers are ministerial appointments, not necessarily appointed through a competitive role. On the one occasion, in recent years, where the Welsh Government has commissioned an independent adviser, just because of insight and experience, we actually approached one of the advisers used by Scottish Government, and he was contracted very specifically for that piece of work. So, that remains an option to us as well, but the choice of independent adviser, to go back to your question, ultimately remains a matter for the First Minister, in process terms as well as for the individual themselves.

09:50

Okay, thank you. So, since 2017, the then First Minister amended the code. Can you advise how many referrals of a potential breach of the ministerial code have been made to an external independent adviser, and who has been appointed?

Yes. So, since 2017, when those changes were put in, there has been no appointment of an independent external investigator. There was the one occasion where that occurred. It's probably worth saying that—

Sorry. Sorry, I don't understand. Can you say that again?

Yes. There's been no independent external investigator appointed in the time frame, since 2017, when those changed arrangements were put in place. As I was describing earlier, the normal practice has been, given the nature of the complaints, to use the internal proprietary and ethics team, which is available as an option to the First Minister. But, perhaps to set it in context and to give a feel for it, there have been around 30 investigations under the code, to different degrees, through this parliamentary term of the Senedd. Some of those are low-level considerations; others have been more significant and have been, of course, in the public domain as well. But just to give you a feel for overall numbers. And I described earlier, of course, that we end up with complaints coming in from members of the public, some of which don't get pursued at all, because they're probably just a misunderstanding of the code as well, but, directly to your answer, no uses of an independent external investigator.

Wales, it seems to me, is the only country within the UK that doesn't have a designated external independent adviser to investigate potential breaches of the code. Is there a rationale for that? [Inaudible.]

It's the custom and practice of Welsh Government, over the years; other administrations have adapted and changed. I think there is some good experience elsewhere on that. I guess, at a very simple level, the decision to change in that direction would be a matter for the First Minister, not for officials, so it is a choice that they can make, but it hasn't been the case to date.

I would just like to reassure the committee, perhaps through your question, that, whatever the First Minister may choose to do in the future, advice that has gone to Ministers from the civil service on the ministerial code has always been, as I said earlier, impartial, objective and perhaps not always what they were hoping to hear. So, our role is actually to undertake the investigation, in line with the process that's been set up in place with the FM, and to guide that by our normal civil service code principles as well. But I'm sure the experience elsewhere of the use of independent investigators and advisers will be something that the First Minister may have an overall interest in. We have contacts with those administrations, but it would be a matter for them to decide.

Rhianon, before you come to your next question, can I just come in on a very quick supplementary, if I may? Because it's become custom and practice for the standards committee in the Senedd, over a number of terms, to produce reports calling for the appointment of a designated external independent adviser. Would you or your predecessors have given advice, would you expect, to the then First Ministers regarding such recommendations? And what advice, if any, would you provide if such a recommendation was made again?

Well, I don't know whether my predecessors would have given that advice; it is quite possible on that. Some of the changes to the ministerial code back in 2017, no doubt, would have placed an emphasis on some of these choices that are available to First Ministers, and my sense would have been that that would of course have been advice that was being sought. If I am asked the question, then of course we would provide an appropriate response in a positive manner. We would be able to reach out to experiences that exist elsewhere, both in Scottish Government, around their process for appointment, the mechanisms by which it works, and also we would be able to draw on that from a UK Government perspective as well. Although, at the UK Government level, as you would expect, the oversight still remains with the Prime Minister, and I think it's really important to say that that is the case on the First Minister decisions in this area. But we, as always, would be happy to give wider reflections, if that's what the First Minister wanted, but it would be their choice to ask for that advice to come in.

09:55

I was just going to state that the Institute for Government and Transparency International say that there should be advice, that there should be a stand-in, external, independent adviser. Also, Dr Helen Foster has stated that the independent adviser should be able to initiate their own investigations without needing the explicit consent of the First Minister. What are the pros and cons around that from your perspective, Dr Goodall?

Well, whatever the pros or cons are, it's a fundamental matter for the First Minister to decide the ministerial code. Of course, I would be and my colleagues would be very happy to give the balance of advice on that to show how it works elsewhere, and to leave it as a decision for the First Minister.

If these were matters around the civil service code, of course, I would be deciding those and declaring them for myself. But I guess, in a useful way, we at least have those alternative experiences elsewhere. I'm very happy to draw those to the First Minister's attention and allow them to make a very balanced decision if they wanted to change the arrangements in any way.

Okay. The UK Government Cabinet Secretary has said the investigation of the conduct of the Prime Minister by a serving civil servant should be 'avoided wherever possible', and has added that the role of the civil service

'is not to provide some sort of judicial function over Ministers',

which is why the role of the independent adviser was created. Obviously, you've responded to that position in the comments that you've just made, so I'm not going to ask you if you share his views or not. But, obviously, there's a theme there.

I'm going to move on to my next question. In its consultation response, Transparency International UK said the investigation process

'should be at arms-length from the operations of government as the relationships between Ministers and civil servants could be perceived to present a conflict of interest.'

On that particular point, do you see that there is a conflict of interest?

To touch on your initial question that you moved on from as well, I don't think colleagues or the team, when they are asked to provide this process, feel constrained in that sense about providing that guidance. The fact that there are propriety and ethics teams in place in all of the administrations does show that there are a range of issues that occur under the ministerial code. So, whilst visible appointments of independent investigators is one part of it, propriety and ethics teams are actually handling probably most of the complaints that come in through this mechanism and discharging that across the UK in a very professional way.

As I think I outlined in an answer to one of your colleagues earlier, I don't see the tension in the same way because I think it's our responsibility as the civil service to provide that clear and impartial advice. That is part of the code arrangements. That's the way in which we work in that manner. But I do think that the separation with the central team just acts to remove that in terms of the tension that may exist with Ministers who are then supported on a day-to-day basis by their policy officials as well. I do think that works pretty well. So, again, other mechanisms are available, and there are pros and cons and choices on all of those, but we will always try to discharge that advice professionally and impartially.

Okay. Thank you very much indeed. I think I will just pick up on a point there. Transparency International have provided a response to us, stating the Welsh Government should appoint an independent adviser

'through a transparent process, removed from the First Minister.'

It also said the investigation process

'should be at arms-length from the operations of government as the relationships between Ministers and civil servants could be perceived to present a conflict of interest',

which is a principle established, routinely, in all sectors, irrespective of the decency, correct appropriateness of the individuals concerned, who are often put in an invidious situation if they're having to take roles that go beyond their impartial positions. Do you challenge Transparency International UK's interpretation, and if so, why?

10:00

It would be interesting to have an open conversation with them to understand their concerns and to respond to them. As I've tried to outline, I don't see the constraints in the same way because of the way in which the civil service is intended to give that advice. We've tried to manage our way around it by providing that more corporate and central support, and to build up experience in the propriety and ethics field. I absolutely accept that there are other alternative ways of doing it, but it shouldn't be seen to get in the way of, as civil servants, us giving the proper advice in that sort of process. And it is proper that other officials can support their Ministers in the day-to-day arrangements. We can separate those arrangements, however difficult they feel, and I'm sure if the director of propriety and ethics were here he would say that he's felt always that he's been able to give his very clear and open advice in respect of all of the arrangements that he's been part of over these many years.

In respect of handling process and mechanisms, I think it's very proper to be able to describe, if independent investigators are appointed, the mechanism by which they are appointed, whether it is drawing in from an available field or it is through a procurement process. Depending on the context and the circumstances, there may be a need for an individual with very specific skills, as Mr Hedges was outlining earlier, and we just want to have that flexibility in here. It's not necessarily to open up a transparent competitive process for appointments, but it is to be transparent about the way in which individuals have been drawn in and the skill set that they will make available to us. So, again, I would be interested in the open conversation about it, but I think we do discharge it, as I said to a previous question, in an open and professional manner and discharge that, I hope, in a good way to the First Minister.

Given, as you quite rightly indicate, that civil servants are required to provide impartial advice to Ministers and support for them, is it right in your view that civil servants should be put in the position of having to potentially investigate the very Ministers they're having to provide impartial advice to?

I don't think it at all changes the principles of the way in which the civil service are to behave and to act, but to mitigate the concerns of those kinds of risks, it's why you will find all of the UK administrations building up expertise and experience through their respective propriety and ethics teams. And of course, others of us who have to be involved in this process try to make sure that that advice is given in an appropriate and clear manner.

Just to confirm, the other Governments in the UK have appointed independent advisers into a role specified for that purpose. Am I correct?

They do use independent advisers in those roles, and they have a choice about the way in which they discharge it, but that won't necessarily apply to every individual example of a potential ministerial code issue or breach, because they will inevitably have a subset of the kind of categories I was describing earlier, ranging from requests from MPs, from members of the public, so the propriety and ethics teams will be filtering those and of course allowing the Prime Minister or the First Minister in their respective administrations to make those final decisions.

Moving on, the ministerial code sets out that Government property should not generally be used for constituency work or party political activities. But as you know, the waters have become muddied by the development of modern technology and what devices can and cannot or should or should not be used, and what should or should not be said by persons to persons. What is your view on the robustness of the ministerial code in this context, given the changes in how people now communicate?

As a general principle, I think the code is really clear on the way in which property is used in a very general sense, I guess from a facilities perspective as much as different areas. I think sections 4.1 to 4.4 cover that in overall terms, making that more clear to Ministers, particularly in the way that they have to discharge their day-to-day ministerial lives as well. Of course, we have wider advice that we provide into the organisation that would cover a series of different arrangements, including informal mechanisms as well.

My starting point on this would be to say that we start, really, by being clear about our information governance and our records retention policies, which have been in place for many years. They are guided by legislation and also by code issues, certainly from a civil service code perspective. And it is really clear about the mechanisms for ensuring that the official record is retained and the process around official decisions is retained. And irrespective of all of the different ways in which this happens and how things, as you quite rightly say, have changed over the years, nothing has really changed the legislation around this to ensure that there should always simply be a focus on the official record.

What we've had to do on a subsequent basis, of course, however, is to make sure that there is clear advice into the organisation on the use of informal messaging; any areas that would encroach on official business should be dealt with by other mechanisms. We have our own official messaging channels, including our teams process that we have within the Welsh Government to accommodate that. Teams, and indeed Ministers, need to ensure that if there is anything that needs to be part of the official record, that they should translate that across as appropriate. But it's one of the interesting things, reflecting on the UK Cabinet manual, in the sense that, given that that has not been updated since 2011, it's not really reflecting this changed world of expectations around these types of areas. So, I think we try to be really clear internally in the organisation. We do provide guidance out into the organisation—we have done so both in 2022 and 2024—to give clarity on that.

But just reflecting at a more personal level, I think, given the nature of areas that have been overseen through the COVID public inquiry, what that has revealed is that there is a range of differences about how different administrations are applying their policies and procedures. And I think, probably, with respect to the inquiry, we're just waiting for their own advice in order to see whether there is a need to update policies in a very different way. So, as an example, we do not provide for WhatsApp messaging on formal Welsh Government devices, but the UK Government and the Scottish Government would have mechanisms like that. We go down that route for security reasons, for example. But it does show this very general practice, irrespective of us all operating in a UK civil service context as well. So, I know that we are all awaiting recommendations in order to just make sure that we can apply that in a consistent manner across the UK as well as to see whether we need to upgrade our policies and procedures as well. 

10:05

You referred to the guidance issued internally. Could you develop that a little bit? What specific guidance, if any, is provided to Ministers on the use of Welsh Government-issued devices, including mobile phones, and does such guidance specify any activities that are stricly prohibited and advice about the security measures that Ministers should take to protect their devices?

Going back to my opening answer about describing the legislation and the policies and procedures that are in place in respect of decision making and our official records, that applies in this arena of using the non-corporate communication approaches and informal messaging as well. So, that stands from a practical perspective.

The fact that discharging official business with some informal messaging apps—. They're not available on our devices in the first place, therefore we are protecting the outlook with security arrangements that are in place. But, as I indicated, they are different across the whole of the UK. But the guidance that we provide into the civil service—and I know that this is also referenced in the current version of the Cabinet handbook that we have provided to you, in confidence at this stage but that will feature later—does outline those expectations for Ministers to use it in that way. 

In May 2024, as an example, we provided guidance that was both to Ministers and also to officials that was on the Welsh Government's position on the use of these different areas. But it's always about the test of whether information relevant and appropriate to the official record and for official decision making is being retained or not. I think there's been very good and clear guidance over the years for the civil service and also for Ministers.

Will this be a routine part of ministerial induction in the future?

The world has changed, hasn't it? It's really important that we do that. I just think we need to be open to say that I would expect that every administration in the UK, once it receives reflections from the COVID public inquiry, no doubt, will want to just review their overall mechanisms to see whether there is any significant change or adaptations that are going to be needed as well. But, yes, absolutely, this is why it's something that is shared within the Cabinet handbook, and as I described to you earlier, the Cabinet handbook is really a to-do guide for Ministers and we will have the chance to include that content even further within the version that’s produced at the end of this calendar year.

10:10

And just developing on your answers, if you could just clarify, are all communications on Welsh Government-issued devices considered official business, and if not, why not?

The focus is on the content of our official records and those items that would be relevant to the decisions that are taken as well. We’re very clear in the way in which we translate it. I think any individual needs to understand that if they are using informal messaging—text messaging, for example, is available on Welsh Government devices—the moment when that triggers into something that is more in line with official use, that should be translated to be part of the record, or people should be switching to other mechanisms. So, we need to marshal the lines on that and the boundaries, but this is an expanding area of technology, of course, and we just need to consider that, particularly as, no doubt, different apps and different messaging devices appear over the forthcoming number of years as well.

If a Minister texts their family to say they're going to be late for dinner, or texts their friend to say that they'll meet them in the pub on Saturday night, is that official Government business?

Informal use in that kind of way wouldn't represent official Government business. You would be expecting that those would relate to much more significant matters, and it's quite appropriate that, inevitably, there'll be some informal use of devices for those kinds of reasons as you've described.

Yes, that would be permissable as informal use, but if it ever converted to more official status, we would be expecting people to appreciate that and switch to the appropriate area. Just, again, to be really clear: internally in the Welsh Government, we do use Teams messaging, very significantly, as a way of allowing for that kind of internal protected conversation to take place, but which also allows us to convert some of the conversations that take place to make sure that they are part of the official record when that is needed and required. 

Diolch, Cadeirydd. If I could move over to how Government Ministers make use of resources—still sort of linked to the questions the Chair was asking, but still rather separate. On 23 May of this year, the Government indicated that it would respond to factual requests from Members. So, I’m interested to understand how this plays a part as part of the other arrangements that are usually in place in a pre-election period—stuff like access talks as an example. How does it interact with the rest of what is usually the norm in this period?

There's very clear guidance that’s given for the pre-election period. I think sometimes there can be confusion about the way in which we interact with pre-election guidance when it’s through the UK general election process rather than what is the Senedd process.

As an example, in the recent pre-election period of time, in the Welsh Government and in Wales we were getting on with our normal business, noting the wider election taking place. But the Senedd was still meeting, there were still First Minister’s questions and we were carrying on with normal business. So, from a UK general election perspective, there are no mechanisms for us in the Welsh Government as officials to get involved in that process—that is overseen at the UK Government civil service level and not least handled by the Cabinet Secretary who would discharge that as well. On occasion, we get confused about that—to think that Welsh Government is doing something peculiar, but what we would have been doing would have been carrying on with our normal process.

At the same time, we do have our own pre-election guidance that is in place when we are involved in our Senedd process. It’s been used to different degrees over the years, but they are very much protected conversations that take place discreetly between the civil service, usually involving the Permanent Secretary, and the party concerned. I guess for clarity, as you would expect, none of that is reported back to the First Minister, because it's very clear in the guidance and advice and very proper that that should remain as a protected conversation. Not all opposition parties necessarily take advantage of those mechanisms. And whilst I’ve not been through that process myself yet, my predecessors have. They can often just tend to be quite a short, single meeting, perhaps with not much follow-up at this time. But it’s really correct, given that you were talking about these sorts of factual requests, to say that we wouldn’t normally comment on, or give advice about policies if we were sat in those pre-Senedd election access talks, and we would follow the guidance. In an informal way, and on a proper basis, it might be possible we could give an indication on whether a particular policy was likely to be affordable, but it would really depend on the context, and mostly it would be unusual to sort of go down that route. But we’ll just have to see, next time these mechanisms work, that we just try to ensure that there is a proper, protected conversation that allows the basis of relationships to be built up, and to make sure that there is trust and confidence in that as well.

The factual information is something we don’t deal with. But, perhaps as an aside, I could say there’s a danger in this of feeling that there’s never any occasion when we will, obviously with some interest, look at how a policy impact could happen. And maybe if I could move myself from the pre-access talks, and talk about general processes, if there is a potential budget agreement that is taking place, or if, for example, an equivalent of a co-operation agreement arrangement was under consideration, then, as you would expect, at the edges of those, there may well be some examples of policy or expectations where there could be a financial cost to it. But there would be a wish to understand that before entering that kind of agreement, whether it is in the budget process that’s happening, and that is just normal standard practice and it would be very proper for the civil service to give that kind of advice.

10:15

Thank you for that. Taking on board, of course, what you said about those conversations being private between civil servants and the Permanent Secretary, what happens in the case, then—. Because, obviously, when we’re coming into an election, political parties tend to, then, talk about the policies they want to implement and the ideas they have. What stops a Minister from going to a civil servant and saying, 'Oh, there’s this policy that’s been put forward, could you cost that policy for us and give us advice on whether that is doable and the potential constraints that the Government has?' Because, of course, civil servatns are required to provide impartial information to the Minister, and we accept that, but I think it’s reasonable to then say, ‘Well, all we’re asking for is the cost’. That, in itself, is impartial, isn’t it? It’s not asking for an opinion either way. So, I’m just trying to get an understanding, here, as to how, say, the ruling party at the time could use the civil service, or leverage the civil service as an additional resource, not be it directly, but indirectly within an election.

My view is that it’s possible, but, in practice, it doesn’t happen. I’ve been in the Welsh Government myself since 2014. I’ve overseen the process of the UK general election with very clear election guidance put in place to ensure that we’re able to oversee these lines and what is proper and not proper. In my experience—and I know this would have been the experience of my predecessors—there is real clarity on the guidance that we give to the civil service to be aware of this, but also to Ministers themselves in discharging this, not to cause that problem. And, just speaking about the way in which I know our usual consideration around the UK general election happened, that was, in my view, received in very good order, and appropriately so, by Ministers able to keep an eye on those mechanisms. I didn’t have any concerns highlighted through that sort of process. And I think that’s a good example of how these things really should work in practice. So, the possibility is there, but, certainly from a Welsh Government or Wales perspective, I’ve not seen that kind of problem.

As I said earlier, we will obviously convert to a different kind of conversation if it’s linked into some of our processes that are removed from election, like budget mechanisms and potential support agreements, or whatever is in place, because we do need to understand the financial implications of policies if the Government is trying to work differently with any particular party. But, yes, my own view would be that it's a very respectful environment, really understood. It might be different elsewhere, of course, in the UK, but I didn’t find that was our experience in Wales.

But you accept that it can happen? With the pressure that could be put on a civil servant by a Minister, or a special adviser, there’s a balance of power question here, isn’t there?  

So, the question for me is—okay, you might not have seen it yourself; it doesn’t mean to say it’s not happening—what are the safeguards that are in place, then, to ensure that it doesn’t happen.

Well, there’s the possibility of it taking place. We’re very clear on this guidance. It’s not behind-the-scenes guidance; it’s very upfront with the civil service itself, in a very visible manner right across the organisation. And we have mechanisms in place that, should a member of staff highlight something or be concerned about something like that, as a mechanism to support them. I expect directors general to have an oversight role if needed within their group mechanisms, closer to Ministers. I'm available myself about those requirements as well. And as you will have read in the ministerial code itself, there is a requirement for Ministers not to put civil servants in that arena because they would constitute ministerial code issues as well. So, I think there's a lot of guidance and advice wrapped around it, but, yes, of course, we have mechanisms where, if individuals feel uncomfortable, they should look to raise it. In my experience, I would feel that, if we raised something, then that would be understood and we would be able to handle it in a very direct manner.

10:20

Thank you for that. I think it's an important line of questioning, specifically coming into the pre-election period. In assessing the general election, there were a number of civil servants who actually made those accusations, that there were Ministers attempting to leverage the civil service to either cost their own policies or cost opposition policies. So, I think it's important that we keep a watching brief on this. But with those mechanisms specifically, then, what are the mechanisms? So, say now a civil servant comes to you, and says, 'X Minister has told me that they want this policy costed', what would then be the action taken by you or the civil service body?

Firstly, to acknowledge what you said, I am aware, of course, that there may well have been other reflections, from a UK perspective, in that process. And, of course, given we are part of the UK civil service, we would be mindful of that. But I just wanted to give you some reassurance on how I think we try to discharge that practice and how I've observed it over time—over the last 10 years, certainly, from a personal perspective as well.

We would simply want to understand the context and make a judgment. Some of those issues could be something that was just addressed simply at the director general level, because it may just be an intervention or perhaps even an assessment that either says that there is a problem or not. We introduced the mechanism as we were in the pre-election guidance with a small group of colleagues who could be used to just test whether there would be any of these issues. So, there was a reference that would have been available should there have been a problem, but, in fact, we were able to safeguard around those arrangements from my perspective as well. So, happy on that as well. And I personally feel that, given the First Ministers that I have worked with, I would have been able to speak very directly and personally to them, explain the situation, and, given the seriousness in which they would have set out their expectations for Ministers, I believe that they would have taken it very seriously as well.

That, to me, sounds like there's just an element of trust, in that sense, rather than there actually being something actionable there. It's all well and good saying that previous First Ministers might have taken it seriously and made it clear to their Cabinet Ministers that they shouldn't be doing that, but what happens then when you have a First Minister, or even a Minister, that couldn't care less about that?

Well, to take the mechanism to its ultimate level, the civil service code is really clear about the protection that is there for civil servants to be able to discharge their role and without that interference in the way that you described about Ministers. So, I would have a responsiblity to take that forward from a civil service code perspective. And, equally, as you will see from the content of the ministerial code yourself, if a Minister was involved in that kind of arena, and it was inappropriate, then the First Minister would be able to reflect on the ministerial code issues and determine if there was any action to be taken there. So, there are formal mechanisms in place, through the process that the civil service code has, and also through the ministerial code. So, they would be the ultimate mechanisms to use. But, yes, of course, there is also trust and confidence, because I've not had the experience of feeling that that has been an area to be concerned about, and certainly it has been an area where I would always feel that my best advice would be taken by a First Minister if I at all raised any of these concerns.

Thank you. If you were pushed on this, hypothetically, in the future, could you just say 'no'?

Well, absolutely. The civil service code is really clear on the boundaries for the civil service, and the ministerial code is really clear on the kinds of actions that can be requested by Ministers. I support the First Minister in discharging their role and arrangements. I have my own line manager arrangements, of course, in the sense that I report to the Cabinet Secretary who oversees the UK civil service. And, in very extraordinary circumstances, I'm able to deploy those if I had real concerns. But, yes, I have to marshall the lines for the civil service and on behalf of the civil service, as well as support the discharge of the ministerial code for the First Minister, in order to protect Ministers and the First Minister.

Okay. Thank you. Members, do you have any further questions? I can't see any indication. In which case, I thank Dr Goodall for being with us this morning. We've concluded our questions a little earlier than anticipated, which I'm sure will be devastating for you. [Laughter.] A transcript of today's meeting will be sent to you to check for accuracy, as normal. Otherwise, may the rest of your day go as problem free as possible.

10:25

Cadeirydd, diolch yn fawr iawn. Hwyl fawr.

Chair, thank you very much. Goodbye.

3. Cynnig o dan Reol Sefydlog 17.42 i benderfynu gwahardd y cyhoedd o'r cyfarfod ar gyfer eitem 4 a gweddill y cyfarfod ar ôl eitem 6
3. Motion under Standing Order 17.42 to resolve to exclude the public from item 4 of the meeting and for the remainder of the meeting after item 6

Cynnig:

bod y pwyllgor yn penderfynu gwahardd y cyhoedd o'r cyfarfod ar gyfer eitem 4 a gweddill y cyfarfod ar ôl eitem 6 yn unol â Rheol Sefydlog 17.42(ix).

Motion:

that the committee resolves to exclude the public from item 4 of the meeting and for the remainder of the meeting after item 6 in accordance with Standing Order 17.42(ix).

Cynigiwyd y cynnig.

Motion moved.

In accordance with Standing Order 17.42(ix), I propose that the committee resolves to meet in private for item 4 of today's meeting and the remainder of the meeting after item 6. Are all Members content? Thank you. I see that all Members are content, so I'd be grateful if the clerking team could take us into private session.

Derbyniwyd y cynnig.

Daeth rhan gyhoeddus y cyfarfod i ben am 10:25.

Motion agreed.

The public part of the meeting ended at 10:25.

10:55

Ailymgynullodd y pwyllgor yn gyhoeddus am 10:59.

The committee reconvened in public at 10:59.

5. Sesiwn dystiolaeth: Penodiadau Cyhoeddus Comisiwn y Senedd
5. Evidence Session: Senedd Commission Public Appointments

Croeso, bawb. Welcome, everybody, back to the Public Accounts and Public Administration Committee meeting this morning in the Senedd. We will now take evidence from the Senedd Commission, the Welsh Parliament Commission, in relation to our usual annual scrutiny of their report and accounts and on matters relating to our inquiry into public appointments. A short break will be taken during the session to allow for a change in witnesses. Croeso, welcome, to the participants, or the witnesses. I’d be grateful if you could state your names and roles for the record.

11:00

Diolch, Cadeirydd. Fy enw i yw Manon Antoniazzi, a fi yw Clerc a Phrif Weithredwr Comisiwn y Senedd.

Thank you, Chair. I am Manon Antoniazzi, and I am the Chief Executive and Clerk of the Senedd Commission.

Member
Hefin David 11:00:11
Commissioner for Budget and Governance, Senedd Commission

My name's Hefin David, Senedd Commissioner for budget and governance.

Hi, I'm Leanne Baker, I'm the chief people officer at the Senedd.

Thank you. We have a number of questions for you. I’d be grateful if both yourselves and Members could be as succinct as possible in answering them in order to cover the wide range of topics generated. As you’ve heard, we propose a short break after about an hour in the session for a comfort break or otherwise. As convention has it, I will ask the first question. So, can you describe the role of Senedd Commission staff in supporting Crown and Senedd appointments?

Thank you, Chairman. The role of Senedd Commission staff varies according to the Senedd’s role in any given recruitment process. So, for example, the Finance Committee, of course, is responsible for oversight of the Wales Audit Office and the Public Services Ombudsman for Wales. Therefore, the role of the Finance Committee there involves nominating a preferred candidate for Auditor General, and also for the role of ombudsman. It then also appoints non-executive members of the Wales Audit Office board and recommends the appointment of its chair. So, under those circumstances, what Senedd Commission staff do is provide a secretariat for those processes, occasionally a senior member of staff to help with the panel duties. We would advise on recruitment strategies, including the use of executive search agencies, if that was the committee’s preference. It’s a similar process then in supporting the standards committee, who have the responsibility of deciding on a preferred candidate for the standards commissioner role, which is then appointed by the whole Senedd. So, our role as Commission staff is basically one of support and administrative backup and advice. We support committees in the same way when they undertake pre-appointment hearings.

The slightly more intense involvement comes in two further categories of appointment. One is members of the independent remuneration board that sets terms and conditions for Members. And because it wouldn’t be appropriate for Members to be involved in the appointment of new recruits to that board, I as chief executive am responsible for those appointments. Then, the Commission is also responsible for appointing its own independent advisers. So, there’s a range of advisers there where we run that recruitment. That's, in a nutshell, the different kind of involvement that we have in the case of different processes.

Okay. And a further question for you in particular, if I may: what procedures does the organisation have in place to support you and the Senedd committees in arranging the recruitment to Crown and Senedd appointments, and how do you ensure that these are consistently applied?

Well, we operate—. The recruitment principles that we employ, and we employ across staff appointments as well, are similar to the Cabinet Office principles that incorporate the Nolan principles—fairness, openness, diversity and so on. So, we would seek to apply those consistently. The role of the—. We will then take our lead, on appointments that are the committee’s responsibility, from the committee. We will supply the support that they want in any particular recruitment.

Okay, thank you. Did anybody else wish to comment? No. Other Members will now take up the questions. I invite Mike Hedges to raise some matters with you. Mike.

Diolch, Cadeirydd. The Senedd Commission internal audit plan 2023-24 noted it would carry out an audit review of the systems and processes in place to support committees in their roles in relation to public appointments. What was the outcome of the audit, and what assurance did it give that the systems and processes in place are fit for purpose and demonstrate value for money?

11:05

Thank you. Yes, we received the results of that audit in February of this year. Going back to my previous answer, it focused on the Commission staff’s role and whether there were any improvements that we could make there. By and large, we had an encouraging assessment, but there were some action points, and they included clarifying the relationship between various Commission staff teams in the recruitment—committee clerks and the HR teams and the finance teams involved—it involved setting ourselves clear key performance indicators, then, at the outset, and conducting formal evaluations after every recruitment to make sure that we learn the lessons.

So, I think the big lesson was to formalise those lessons-learnt exercises and also to make sure that the various teams that are involved in supporting committees in the appointments speak to each other about, for example, the role of executive search and other recruitment methods to enhance the diversity of the candidate set. So, all of those recommendations were received; they’ve been acted upon.

No further questions, Mike? Well, in that case, can I invite Rhianon Passmore to take up the questions?

Diolch, Chair. Moving to the Crown and Senedd appointments area in a bit more depth, how would you assess the effectiveness to date of the Commission’s diversity and inclusion strategy 2022-26 in ensuring the talent pipelines for our public/Crown appointments are, and I'll quote,

‘diverse and processes optimised for inclusion and reaching the widest audience’?

So, in what circumstances would your staff—and you mentioned this earlier—recommend the use of executive search agencies for recruitment campaigns? And if you could flesh out when those would be used and how we assess the effectiveness and value for money of using those vehicles, that would be very useful.

Thank you. We have collected and analysed applicants’ diversity data since 2022, so we don’t have a huge number of campaigns, but we have a breakdown of the diversity data there. We hope that, as the years go by, we will have a richer dataset, and I’ll ask Leanne as our chief people officer to come in in a minute on that.

But I think we draw on the bank of knowledge that we have from recruiting our own executive staff as well when we’re making public appointments, and there are a lot of lessons that we have learnt in terms of breaking down barriers for people who might not think of applying for jobs in the Senedd Commission that can be transferable to public appointments in those cases, and we’re always aware of being able to give that advice to committees.

The use of executive search agencies is one way of making sure that we are reaching applicants who might need a bit of encouragement to put their names forward. But, Leanne, can I hand over to you to talk a little bit more in detail, because there’s a lot of work that our teams have concluded in this area?

So, as Manon has alluded to, we’ve done four campaigns so far, which we’ve collected the diversity data on. It’s not a lot of data that we’ve got as a result, but, however, what the data is telling us from those initial datasets is that there is a lot of room for improvement there, particularly in appointing women into these positions, those from ethnic minority backgrounds, and, in particular, disabled people.

As Manon mentioned, we do use executive search agencies. Now, how that’s used in these appointments is down to the individual committees, if they're committee led, those appointments, and, during that process, there is a value-for-money exercise that is undertaken. So, for the last Audit Wales appointments that were undertaken, the decision was made not to use an executive search agency, but from the rudimentary—and it is rudimentary—data that we’ve got, it does demonstrate, it does show, that when we have used executive search agencies, it does provide for better outcomes in terms of progressing diversity through that process.

But, in terms of the support that we as officials provide to the committees, and in the work that we do for our own public appointments, certainly, we advise on the use of gender-neutral candidate packs, making sure that they are as inclusive as possible. We are in the process of refreshing our intranet pages, going forward, on public appointments, so we can use I think what they call peer-led stories, where we use real-life individuals to give prospective appointees an overview of what it's like to be on a board, to try and reach out to those candidates who wouldn't think that they could be on a board, so they are able to relate and identify. Work is continuing, and, certainly, the data sets are something that we're going to concentrate on in more detail, going forward. Sorry, Mike's waving there—.

11:10

Sorry, Rhianon, Mike Hedges is asking if he can come in, but have you finished your sentence, first?

Yes, thank you.

If Adam was here, he'd say, 'How do you ensure we have 20 per cent of applicants speaking Welsh?' I will say, 'Are you now recording the first part of the postcode of where people live?' because I have concerns that it's posh Cardiff and the Vale that do disproportionately well.

So, in terms of where we advertise—so, that's one of the biggest things—obviously, everything that we produce is bilingual, but, certainly, when we are advertising campaigns, they do go into bilingual advertising agencies, such as Golwg360, and, particularly to target the demographic of women, we've advertised on Women on Boards, that website there.

In terms of your question, Mike, around social mobility, absolutely, we are recording data on social mobility going forward. It's something close to my heart within the organisation, and it's data that we've gathered as a Commission. The data is still quite low in people declaring, answering the questions that dictate their social background, but yes, absolutely, going forward, social mobility is one of the unprotected characteristics that we'll be gathering data on, going forward.

A postcode, which you must have, that gives you information, doesn't it? Because most areas are fairly homogenous.

I think definitely that a postcode does provide some information about a candidate, but not all. Some people do move for work and so their background might be significantly different to the postcode that they then find themselves in. So, it's a helpful question, but the questions that we use to ask Commission staff are based on the toolkit provided by the Social Mobility Commission, so we would look to reflect those questions for public appointments.

Thank you. Rhianon, could you take up the questions again, please?

Yes. Thank you so much. Just for clarity, it's been mentioned a number of times that this is very rudimentary data, and, obviously, there was a commitment to publish the data—is that because the numbers are just very low in the first place in terms of appointments? Is there any reasoning why the data is not substantial?

The reason is because, since we made the commitment, there have only been four campaigns. So, there have been two Audit Wales appointments, one Public Services Ombudsman for Wales and when we did the Senedd Commission adviser [Correction: 'Senedd Commission independent adviser'], so there are only four sets of data. The issue that we have with the data as well is because they are, essentially, public figures—you can go on websites and see who these individuals are—we can track the data through the recruitment process, but we can't issue data about the appointee, then, because it would be giving out personal information.

Okay, thank you. When do you expect to fulfil the commitment, bearing in mind what you've just stated in terms of the low numbers and identifying factors, to be able to publish the data on public appointments in regard to that original strategy commitment?

We could look to publish the data. We'll obviously take advice on what levels of information we're able to publish. But, in terms of increasing the data sets, that is down to the number of appointments that we've got, and I think our next appointment campaign is in the spring of next year, which is more appointments to the Audit Wales board.

And finally, you've mentioned the areas of improvement around protected characteristics, and we've mentioned unprotected characteristics that are going to come into the mixture. What conclusions have you drawn from the analysis of the data that you do have?

11:15

On the analysis of the data so far, as I said, one of the things is that there are better outcomes when we use executive search agencies, because they're able to reach out to passive candidates who are not necessarily looking to be on a board, or even think that they could be on a board, which is a really important feature. The data that we've drawn on specifically is on gender, ethnicity and disability. The data on disability is really poor; there are very low numbers of individuals with a disability applying. There's a bit more traction from those individuals who are from a minority ethnic background. For women, there's a better picture, but speaking as a woman, I still think the results could be a lot better.

It is about building those data sets, but it's also about making sure that we are able to provide information for prospective candidates who don't think that they could be on a board. Those are the people we need to reach out to in the future. I think there are opportunities for training for individuals who are on these boards. 'Unconscious bias' is a phrase that's obviously used quite often, but certainly, we need to look beyond—. I think some people, some boards look specifically at very polished CVs or they want people with track records. That's great, we understand that there's a place for those individuals on the boards, but there's also room for people who haven't got that kind of portfolio but do bring something different to those boards. So, it's certainly something that we are aspiring to.

Thank you. I'll just ask a quick supplementary before I bring Natasha in. I chair the cross-party group on disability and we've taken evidence on this. Some disabled people have learnt, through experience, not always to declare their impairment at the application process. Will you be doing any retrospective analysis, once people are in role, to establish whether perhaps the representation increases once people are appointed?

It's unfortunate that people feel that they can't declare those, because there is support for individuals who apply, through any recruitment process, to allow them to perform at an interview. Retrospective data might be difficult. Once an individual has made the appointment, they are able to then declare that information retrospectively. I think the challenge for us about public appointments is because they are not Commission staff, there's nowhere to actually record that information unless individuals choose to share that information with us after the event. But certainly, I think your point is looking to make sure that we are very clear, open and transparent about the support that we can provide for anybody who wishes to participate in a public appointment and have the confidence that that would be something that we would help them with, rather than it be held against them.

Thank you so much, Chair. Good morning. Just a quick one: what recruitment processes do you use to attract a strong and diverse field of candidates, specifically in relation to the independent remuneration board? And I'd like to know, and I'm sure the committee would like to know as well, specifically, what media sources you use. Do you use an executive search agency, and if so, which one? If you could shed a bit more light on that, I'd be really grateful.

We do use an executive search agency; they were procured through a contract that we've got. The current provider is a firm called Penna, and we've used them for a number of years. In terms of how the campaign is then devised, that, again, can be something that is led by the committee, although we will advise them on the variety of channels and outlets where they're able to advertise. The most recent example is Audit Wales, which we did earlier in the year. That went on our website, it went on Audit Wales, it went on LinkedIn, Jobs in Wales, Fish4jobs—I'm sure you've all heard of that—but it also went on The Times online, The Sunday Times, The Guardian, Golwg, as I mentioned earlier on. It went on a specific finance website and it went on the Women on Boards website, because obviously, there is, again, the need to diversify in that particular channel.

In terms of executive search, the role that they play, again, can vary. If a decision is made to use them, they can do a basic search, which is to just cast their net out and provide a long list, or they can be part of the process right up until the interview process, and it means, then, that if we engage in an executive search, that search can be more dynamic. So, if we're expecting more diversity, then we can go back out to them and really target what it is that we're looking for. There is a level playing field as part of the process, but it's that encouragement of people to apply for those posts. We cast the net quite wide, and also, again, it's specific down to which areas we're recruiting into, and what boards we're looking into.

11:20

It certainly sounds like you've touched on a lot of different areas to target, which I appreciate. Once you've put the application out on all on sites, and all the different boards that you've just mentioned, how do you assess the effectiveness of whether it's gone well or not?

There is a review that's completed. One of the recommendations from the audit was that a review was conducted of each scheme. With the one that we did most recently about Audit Wales, there was a comprehensive review that was done internally, then there was also a review published on the Senedd webpages. So, that gives us an idea of where we need to make improvements going forward. But, as I said, the schemes are dynamic and, with the executive search, we are able to guide them to the areas that we want them to focus on.

You mentioned Audit Wales a lot in your answer to me, and I appreciate that, but my question is specifically in relation to the remuneration board. Obviously, it's a group that is responsible for all of us here in this building and beyond, so I just want to ask, in relation to them, what the status is with regard to the board.

We would take a similar approach. It's identifying where we would need to put the advert out. We would look specifically at the last time we did a recruitment campaign for the IRB, see if there were any lessons learnt from that campaign, and then adjust that, going forward, accordingly. But, again, it would be a range of specific websites that we would advertise on.

I'm just going to ask my final question now, please, if that's okay, Chair. In relation to, specifically, the remuneration board, we all appreciate that it's an independent element. With regard to every board member that we've ever had in this particular committee, from health boards to all different areas, there's always a level of scrutiny in place. So, I just wanted to ask you what checks and balances have you got in place in relation to the remuneration board members who have been hired, or will be hired in future, to ensure that they are doing the job, and they're doing it well, and they deserve to be in the position that they've actually got.

I'll take that answer, because you've picked, Natasha, on the one recruitment, of course, that is ours, because we need there to be a level of independence from members necessarily built into the system. We have a close relationship with the IRB once they are appointed and in post. We have a recruitment coming up next year—quite shortly now, actually; we might even manage to get it into the end of this year—and we will be using our independent advisers to help provide that assurance at the appointment stage. I know that the chair of the independent remuneration board has annual conversations with her board members. I have a constant dialogue with the chair going forward. They have had an effectiveness review, for example—they had that in March of last year—and they have an action plan to deal with that. So, those assurance mechanisms are in place, as they would be for any other public appointments.

The only reason I'm asking this particular question is because—. And I appreciate that they've done the effectiveness element that you've just mentioned, but it needs to be open and transparent. I appreciate they're independent members, and I appreciate that we don't have any control or power over the decisions that they make in that regard, but it's almost sounding like they're marking their own homework, and that's something that I just wanted to clarify—as an independent board, who is there to actually oversee that they are doing their job, doing it properly and doing it well, and actually proving value for money for themselves?

They're there to take accountability for the level of remuneration that is provided to Members. They were set up so that that responsibility didn't fall on Members' shoulders. And the effectiveness review was not done by them; it was done by a source external to the board. So, to that extent, they don't report to the Senedd Commission, because the Senedd Commission would be the wrong body to have oversight—any political body would be the wrong—. It wouldn't be appropriate for them to have oversight of their work. But they do have these opportunities to reflect on their performance, and I know they have made a big effort over the last years to have feedback from Members, and they have drop-in sessions and so on. But the action plan for the IRB is something for the board itself to answer to. I wouldn't put myself in the position of answering to that. But there is that functional oversight by me of the process of putting them in place.

11:25

There's also the opportunity for elected Commission members to meet with the remuneration board. I think we've got a meeting on the 16 October just to make sure everything is running smoothly. That's myself and the Llywydd, just having a half-hour catch-up and a conversation. But we are very conscious, as Manon has said, to keep that political distance and not to try and influence them in that sense, but to certainly see that everything is going smoothly between the Commission and the remuneration board. 

Diolch, Cadeirydd. I'm conscious of time, so I'll try and keep this to one question. The Finance Committee expressed a view that Welsh Government and Senedd public appointments should be governed by a consistent set of principles. I'd just be interested to understand what your views would be, or what your response to that recommendation would be.

I think, from our point of view, a set of principles across Welsh public appointments might be helpful in getting consistency. I think that if there was a serious proposal, it would need to come from the Commission, and there’d need to be a conversation at Commission level rather than at official level about that. I mentioned at the outset that, when we embark on recruitments, we adopt the kind of policies that are within the Cabinet Office code of governance on public appointments. That is basically Nolan principles like selflessness and integrity. It wouldn't be appropriate for the Senedd to be formally tied to a Cabinet Office guideline, but those are the kind of guidelines that we would hope to include in our own work. 

And those conversations are ongoing at the moment, are they?

No. What I'd say is that if you as a committee wish to issue a recommendation that that needs to be considered, it wouldn't be for the chief executive to introduce that to a Commission meeting, but I would certainly be happy myself to ensure that such an issue was discussed in a meeting. But as the chief executive has said, it needs to be a very broad set of principles, otherwise you start to define within roles, and you've got to be very careful with that. But I know that myself and other Senedd Commissioners will certainly look very carefully at any report you produce and any recommendation in that area.

Thank you very much indeed. That brings this short set of questions to an end. If we could have a five-minute break while we switch around the witnesses. Thank you very much indeed.

Gohiriwyd y cyfarfod rhwng 11:27 ac 11:29.

The meeting adjourned between 11:27 and 11:29.

6. Sesiwn dystiolaeth: Craffu ar Gyfrifon Comisiwn y Senedd ar gyfer 2023-24
6. Evidence Session: Scrutiny of Senedd Commission Accounts 2023-24

Croeso. Welcome back to our meeting this morning. Could I start by welcoming back a couple of witnesses from the previous session? Could I please invite the new witnesses to name themselves and identify their roles for the record? 

11:30

Thank you, Chair. I'm Ed Williams. I'm the director of resources at the Commission. 

Thank you, Chair. I'm the interim chief finance officer. My name's Simon Hart. 

Thank you very much indeed. We have a number of questions for you, and as protocol has it, as Chair, I will begin. How did you prioritise finding the budgetary savings initially needed for the £435,000 reduction in funding at the first supplementary budget in June last year, and then the estimated £794,000 to fund an unbudgeted cost-of-living payment for Commission staff?   

Chair, it was indeed challenging having those two tranches of savings to make in year, as you describe. We knew from the beginning of the financial year that we had to make the first tranche of savings, the £435,000, and we challenged our heads of service to submit budget reduction proposals. So, through that, we were able to stress test the allocation of budgets to various parts of the organisation, and encourage them to undertake forensic reviews of all of the budgetary requirements.

The Commission has asked us to avoid making staff redundant, and therefore it was inevitable that the acceptable proposals would fall more in the area of non-staff budgets. So, we looked hard at the larger budgets that we have in the estates and facilities management department and the information and communication technology department, and we did manage to find some savings. We found £208,000 in EFM and £107,000 in ICT, and that was through the robust renegotiation of contracts to do with service and licensing, and subjects like that. We managed to find savings in energy costs, partially because of the fluctuating price of energy, but also through measures like turning down the heating and the air conditioning in our offices. 

We did then have to look at the project fund, and that's difficult because the projects that make it onto the project fund list are all important projects that have been deemed priorities and they've been deemed important to the business. But we had to define a new level of critical projects in terms of those required by law or health and safety or business continuity, and we did manage to release about £120,000 from the project fund for those purposes. 

So, that got us through the first tranche of savings, but then, as you say, we needed to find a further sum of nearly £800,000 as a result of the cost-of-living crisis—the spike in inflation—and the decision by the Commission to make a cost-of-living payment to staff below the grade of senior civil service. To do that, we had to then look very carefully at all of the discretionary budgets—everything we weren't contracted to provide—and that included some services to Members as well. 

But then, the bulk of the saving had to come from our staffing budget, and so what we did was to start pausing recruitment. So, recruitments that were then in flight or were subsequently introduced for the rest of the financial year after September 2023 were given target start dates that were a bit further away than we would normally have had them, so that we could accrue savings in between the departure of staff through churn and the arrival of their successors. And this was—. I don't know if you want me to go on and talk about the impact of this. It wasn't an easy thing to do. We did find that when we were surveying staff, over a third of staff, in fact, felt that it had had a negative impact on their well-being. And we also started a few months later to see a spike in sickness absence, which is not a good sign. Our unions raised formally with us the desirability of not having an unfunded provision like this, an unbudgeted provision like this, in future. And, of course, we do actually have a live strike mandate at the moment. We're formally in dispute with unions, so that is something that we have to take very seriously.

In terms of the savings that we made on the project fund, to some extent, what we've had to do is defer some of the problem, which has increased the pressure on this year's budget, and the Commissioner and I will be making a case to the Finance Committee tomorrow for next year's budget. But, in the year that we're talking about now, about £0.5 million-worth of projects could not be carried out and, by and large, those are still projects that need to be fitted in at some stage. We do normally—and I must stress this—manage the project fund dynamically, so we do bring forward and defer projects, to some extent, because of changing priorities in the course of the year. But to do it under these circumstances was very challenging, and I'd like to pay tribute to all the service heads, and particularly our financial colleagues, the team that enabled that to happen.

11:35

Okay. Thank you. Well, in answering that, you've also answered my next question, so I can jump to another Member and invite Mike Hedges to ask his questions.

I may stop part of the way through. Given the reduction in funding, can you summarise how in-year project fund costs were managed and how do you prioritise projects?

We have a portfolio management group. I'm sorry to get into the weeds of the governance here, but in order to give a snapshot of how we do manage and compare projects to one another, I think what I'd like to do is hand over to a combination of Ed and Simon, who run this process from day to day and can give you a bit of insight into that. Ed, is that okay?

Yes. Thank you, Manon. So, the executive board, led by the chief executive, has established a group to manage our project fund and to undertake the prioritisation of possible projects against that fund. The executive board sets a strategy. We have what's called a portfolio strategy, which sets a high-level vision for what we're trying to achieve, which is, by and large, to achieve the corporate priorities, and also the criteria through which the group that Simon leads will assess projects. By and large, the criteria are in three categories: around value—value to Members and value to parliamentary business; around cost and around deliverability. There are regular meetings of that group. That group brings forward recommendations to executive board for approval on a regular basis. So, as the chief executive says, a dynamic process but against a clear set of criteria, Member focused and delivery focused. At that point, I'll hand over to Simon, just to see if there's anything he wants to add.

Thank you, Ed. There isn't too much more to add, but perhaps just to say that that group has been running for approximately a year. I was actually the interim chief finance officer when it was initially set up, so I've got the background in terms of when it was set up, and it's a role that I've undertaken in previous organisations. I have to say that I think our approach is particularly sophisticated and particularly effective in what it's trying to do. So, nothing to add in terms of the update that Manon and Ed gave, but it's perhaps just to give that assurance that, compared to best practice, it looks very good to me.

Did you drift any projects across year ends? That's always the trick that people do with projects, isn't it, that instead of finishing on a date within that year, you drift it so it goes into the following you. Did you do any of those?

Well, can I bring Hefin in first and then invite the rest of your colleagues to comment?

All I was going to add before—. Mike's question is a good one, but I was going to add the fact that the supplementary budget went through the Finance Committee, which reflected a lot of these savings, plus the additional ask for staff pay equalisation. The supplementary budget is yet to be passed by Plenary because we're still waiting for the Welsh Government's supplementary budget to be debated on 22 October. But what I would say to this committee is that the Finance Committee has given a clear endorsement to the strategy, via the approach in the supplementary budget, so I think that's important to note.

Just to say we recognise the risk; it's actually—. We have a low level of projects that fall across financial years, partly to do with the circumstances that Manon has set out, that twice last year we had to turn to our project fund to help us with savings. So, some projects that would have come forward, the full suite of projects, didn't come forward. That has added to pressure. But partly because deliverability is top of our criteria. So, there is a lot of challenge from executive board and particularly at the portfolio management group around deliverability, so we don't have year-on-year pressure building.

11:40

I was just going to support Ed, because tomorrow we've got a one-hour long evidence session of me as a Commissioner with the Finance Committee, and some of the things that Mike is referring to about projects moving into the next year, we'll be exploring then. So, we'll be looking at it. This is about looking at what's happened. Tomorrow’s looking at the future, and I'm sure that discussion will be held in depth in the Finance Committee tomorrow.

Rhianon and I will be there at the Finance Committee as we are here in public accounts.

Yes, absolutely. So, there's continuity in the story.

Thank you. Before you continue, Mike, I think the chief executive has a comment.

I just wanted to—. Not that the committee needs reminding, but just to say out loud that, of course, we cannot carry anything forward from year to year and we cannot keep reserves. And therefore we have to be fairly disciplined about the year end, and the auditor would make sure of that as well.

You've got to be disciplined about the year end financially, but the year end is an arbitrary date that bears no relationship to when projects are needed, does it? It stops in April, whenever, whether it's 1 April, 6 April. The project has to be done by this date because we need it, but that going on a week or a fortnight later probably will have no effect on the project, but would change when you were paying.

I absolutely agree with that, and, of course, the challenge for all of us, for anybody operating in this kind of environment, is that we can plan, and then we can be overtaken by events. We've had a couple of infrastructure failures in this year, haven't we, Ed, where we had planned to do something in the following year. There was an issue with our closed-circuit television cameras, for example, but there was a failure, and we had to accelerate the work because it was important to business—critical, in fact—to business continuity. So, we got it fixed there and then. The tauter we budget, the more difficult it is, of course, to accommodate that sort of changing priority, but that's what we aim to do.

Okay. I won't take it any further today. I'll save that up for tomorrow.

Are you revising the timing of capital projects that form part of your mid-term carbon reduction strategy, and how will this impact on reaching your goals?

We have made good progress with many of the improvement measures in the strategy, but it's true to say that some requiring more significant investment have been postponed until resources allow for their procurement. For example, most of Tŷ Hywel and the Senedd buildings are now lit by LED lights, but other items, such as air handling unit upgrades are capital projects that we're working on now, and trying to work out when they're going to be affordable on that prioritised list. And we're also planning life-cycle replacement of the building management system as a whole, and so that's a chunky item for us to accommodate.

Mike, I think the next set of questions as well are with you. Are you happy to take those forward?

Yes, I'll take them forward, Chair. Please be careful—I may run out of voice. How do the key performance indicators drive the delivery of Commission objectives, and how effective are they in assessing the Commission's performance in delivering them?

Thank you. We think our KPIs are useful for us. We judge them to be effective in assessing our performance in the areas that they measure. Obviously, they're as effective as we make them in terms of reporting fully on the results and allowing those to be scrutinised and be accountable for them. And, as with any organisation, a KPI will provide us with clarity around where activity and resourcing should be focused. But I think they tell some interesting stories. I was leafing this morning, preparing for this session, through our current year’s KPIs, and the seventh, for example—the seventh KPI is about the media distribution platforms that we engaged with as a result of our promotion of committee inquiries and report launches. I think we touched earlier on the fact that we have tried, in our current communications strategy, to put people at the heart of what we do, and the strategy has been very much about using the authentic voice of witnesses, of people with lived experience, to tell the story of inquiries that the committees are doing. And we have seen, since the days of COVID when committee activities were fairly constrained, a very dramatic rise in the number of those platforms, year on year, and I think that tells a good story of how we are able to amplify the good work that is being done in committees and put those stories out on media platforms and reach a greater audience—an audience, also, that might not have engaged with the Senedd otherwise.

So, I am assured by my director of communication and engagement that those objective targets, those measurable targets, are something that does galvanise the team, and they're very conscious of the need to report on these KPIs at the end of the year. I mean, it doesn't mean that we will keep the same KPIs forever. We keep them under review as part of our service planning protocol every year, and of course we will, going into the seventh Senedd, have a more root-and-branch radical review, once we know, closer to the date, what—. It will be a time for us to look again at what the organisation might require for its new term.

11:45

I speak from experience in local government where, at one time, we had over 250 key performance indicators, and I don't think you can have that number of key performance indicators. Are there any performance indicators under the key performance indicators that are checking performance but are not seen as the key performance indicators?

I'm going to hand over to Ed in a moment. I don't think I can give you a number, Mike, but we do have service-level goals as well as the corporate ones that we report on. Do you have anything to add to that, Ed?

No, that's fine. I don't want a number, I just wanted to know that you do have them.

Yes, we do.

In that case, I invite Natasha Asghar to take up the questions.

Thank you so much. I'd like to know what changes have you made in terms of the management of internal audit and governance following the departure of the head of internal audit? What benefits will your new approach bring to the table in terms of value for money, and what are the related risks that you can foresee?

Shall I go—? I'll take this one. So, we had an external service provider for internal audit working to an internal head of internal audit. We have—. With bringing in a new chief finance officer with the requisite skills, we moved to a situation where the chief finance officer oversaw an external service that was fully provided by an external service provider. Sorry, I'm repeating myself. So, we have an external provider of the internal audit service, and the lead provider acts as the head of internal audit, reporting to our senior sponsor, which is the chief finance officer, which is currently Simon here. We made that change for a couple of reasons. One is that we believe it complies ever more strongly with the public service internal audit standards, where you need a clear definition of roles and objectivity, and also we believe that it gives us, as a relatively small public body, access to a head of internal audit and a service provider that works across the sector, so has best practice and can bring best practice in this area to us. So, we believe we comply more strongly with the required standards.

And you believe this provides value for money in the long term.

Absolutely, yes.

Okay. So, what have you learnt from the review of procurement and contract management arrangements across the Commission, and what action have you undertaken to relieve capacity pressures and address risks of gaps in controls?

So, we've had a recent internal audit of the procurement card and procurement card use, and we've enacted the main recommendation coming out of that to make sure that the training in that regard—that a log was completed. And we have a full programme of internal audit coming up, and our audit and risk committee receive regular reports and provide challenge to us in that regard.

11:50

Just for my information, then, who went through the training—the whole department?

Everybody involved who has a procurement card.

Okay. All right. In the 2023-24 accounts, you note that the findings of reviews into the effectiveness of the independent remuneration board and the executive board were considered during the financial year. So, what recommendations were made and what actions have you taken in response to those?

I'll set the independent remuneration board slightly to one side. We mentioned that earlier, and I remember talking about this at the last session. So, that's the slightly older of the two reviews. But the executive board effectiveness review was a very useful exercise that we undertook just over a year ago. I was encouraged that—. When we had previously done that exercise in 2017, there were some uncertainties about where decision making lay, and I was encouraged that the findings of last year's report did indicate that there was a lot more clarity around decision making and that the board was growing in its strategic way of working and was able to take that strategic view more frequently. It did give us, of course, some action points, and these have all been acted upon or are in progress.

So, it considered the skills mix of the executive board, it considered the way that it works, just in terms of the administrative back-up that it has and the frequency of meetings and so on, and all of that has adapted. We adopted some new modes of operation during lockdown, for example, and we've learned lessons from that. Some of the better innovations there we've kept on. And on the administrative arrangements, the effectiveness review particularly praised our diligent and effective secretariat team, and I was happy to echo that.

But some of the themes that came out were that we needed to work more closely with the broader leadership team, because executive board consists of seven people, chaired by myself, but we do have heads of service who, between them, represent an incredible resource of experience and talent and knowledge of the organisation. And what we did—the second theme that came out of the effectiveness review was that we needed to look again at our change-management arrangements, our governance of change arrangements, because we were going into a period of massive change. Change is a fair constant in the Senedd, but obviously we were leading up to the elections in 2026. And, in a way, our response to the two things was similar, because in designing new governance arrangements for the change projects that we needed to face, what we did was to populate the new project boards that we were forming with key members of our senior leadership team. So, we've now got a situation where we can be sure that everybody is contributing in different ways to the project board, the portfolio management, that is reaching the executive board in the end to keep an oversight of. That's slightly long-winded, but I hope that's of interest.

On the independent remuneration board, the only thing I'd add to what we were saying earlier is that there is now a structured dialogue under way, because the matters considered by the Commission and the matters considered by the independent remuneration board have so many interdependencies in them that, in the run-up to 2026, we need to make sure that each side has sight of the decision-making timetable of the other, so that we can make sure that decisions are being taken in the right context. And so that is under way now.

Okay. A final question please, Chair, if that's okay. You mentioned that some of the points previously have been addressed, have been looked into and some have been dealt with already. For the ones that are still in progress, have you set a timeline for those? I appreciate that you said that 2026 is the next election for us—

Yes. Well, one recommendation was continuous professional development for the executive board, and what we did was that we deferred having any formal, external help with that last year for budgetary reasons. So, now that we're in—we're hoping that that is going to be affordable this year, so, we would like to be able to do that before the end of the year, wouldn't we, Ed?

11:55

Thank you very much indeed. Could I bring in Rhianon Passmore, please?